The way people produce, exchange and consume food in Cuba is underwritten by cultural and political economic rules as well as economic self-interest. These "rules" are not just formed from the top down, but also from the bottom up, though, as I will explain in this 
Introduction
In this paper I focus on the contrast between food as a commodity that can be valued in terms of price or exchange value, and food as an entitlement (Sen 1981) , which cannot. Ideas and values about what can and cannot be commoditized, when, for example, "community membership supersedes price as a basis of entitlement" (Thompson 1993 (Thompson [1971 The association between economic processes and the creation of value is especially clear in regards to food, which, given its centrality to social life, has long been a subject of anthropological analysis. Audrey Richards, the first anthropologist to engage in a detailed ethnographic study of food and culture, understood the special characteristics of food in its commodity form:
[F]ood stands in a different category from the ordinary commodities of economic exchange. It is an insistent human want, occurring regularly at short intervals, and shared by the whole community alike … [I]t is the mechanism by which food-getting habits are formed in the structure of each different culture that we have to analyze. (Richards 1932: 14-15) While anthropologists have long associated food habits with other cultural forms, they have also found that social uses of food do not always reflect unidirectional flows of value from one domain of life to another. In continuing the sociological project initiated by Mauss (1954 Mauss ( [1925 ) and rekindled by Polanyi (2001 Polanyi ( [1944 ) and his followers, in this paper I attempt to relink embedded aspects of society with the more limited domains delineated by political economic models, including our own. I do so by considering the way dominant ideas are consolidated in Cuban history, the "residual" (Dumont 1980 (Dumont [1966 : 38-9) forms of which shape everyday practices.
The paper is split into three parts. In the first I review the anthropological literature on food provisioning and economic or other value(s), situating Cuba within this theoretical setting. In the second part, I continue along these lines, drawing from historical contexts of value-formation in Cuba to outline the contours and contradictions of its national moral economy. In the final part, I use ethnographic examples to show how the national moral economy in Cuba shapes the production, exchange and consumption of foodstuffs on the ground (the local moral economy of provisioning). I use qualitative evidence from Tuta, a rural village in Cuba (which I have renamed, along with its inhabitants) where I conducted ethnographic fieldwork for fifteen months from 2005 to 2007, returning for another month during the summer of 2011.
Provisioning Processes and Value-formation in Changing Economies
Studies in economic anthropology have largely involved just one economic step in the "provisioning path" (Fine and Leopold 1993) , e.g. consumption. This narrowing of focus has, however, often led the anthropologist to base analysis on assumptions embedded in his or her own value system. For instance, Marcel Mauss's (1954 Mauss's ( [1925 ) exclusive interest in exchange stemmed in part from his ties to the French Marxist tradition. As Marilyn Strathern (1999: 139) notes, Mauss's interest in exchange was the product of his situated position as a revolutionary socialist and the manager of a consumer cooperative in France. As did Maurice Bloch a decade earlier (Bloch 1989: 176) , Strathern refers to the central idea of exchange in anthropology as arising from Mauss's political concern about the alienation of property in capitalism (Strathern 1999: 139) .
More recently, and in a similar vein, much attention in anthropology has been given to non-market, localized aspects of consumption (e.g. Friedman 1994; Weiss 1996; Miller 1994 Miller , 2001 ), which have again tended to overshadow wider symbolic and material processes of provisioning such as the intentions and values of producers. Susan Narotsky (2005) has asserted that studies which focus entirely on the consumer end disregard the "complex ways that power and interest can shape a provisioning chain" (Narotsky 2005: 81) . Over fifteen years ago, sociologists Ben Fine and Ellen Leopold made a similar point, insisting that consumption of any commodity is "contingent upon, if not determined by, the production, distribution and circulation of value" (Fine and Leopold 1993: 255 ; emphasis added).
The anthropology of consumption has too often ignored important work on the political economy of commodity flows (e.g. Mintz 1985; Watts 1999) , as well as anthropologies and geographies of value and money, 1 key analytical tools for deciphering how, when and what kinds of valuations historically emerge and change in particular places. Even cultural perspectives on the biographies of commodities (Appadurai 1986; Kopytoff 1986; Cook 2004) sometimes consider only what happens from the checkout to the home (Miller 2001 ). Studies such as The Dialectics of Shopping (Miller 2001 -I would prefer ' ibid.' for these), for example, openly disregard more profound political economic and cultural processes of valueformation, which occur before the commodity reaches the megastore, or even before the megastore itself became a requisite for the "good" London housewife. Indeed, while Miller's consideration of "our labor of love" in shopping (Miller 2001: 53) follows the Maussian tradition of revealing the "universal" (Miller 2001: 53) link between persons and objects, he deliberately (Miller 2001 : 2) leaves out wider historical and political economic issues that relate people to commodities, which may have clarified how norms of the market have come to define London shoppers as persons in the first place. Such blind spots in analyses allow the market to creep in through the back door: "exchange creates value rather than people," and the fetishism of commodities becomes a methodological principle (Gregory 1997: 44) .
Following critical approaches to value in economic anthropology, in this paper I argue that local rules for provisioning in Cuba are related to historical determinations of appropriate economic action, some of which stem from a wider community (e.g. the nation state), some from the market. Finding oneself in the protected position of a tourist, a visitor to Cuba rarely has the opportunity to understand the bigger picture in which both state and market are embedded. Fortunately, the boundaries which separate tourist and Cuban, market and state spheres (Bohannan 1955 (Bohannan , 1959 of economic activity were partially lifted for me during the fieldwork period. The visa I obtained was not that for an academic visitor, nor was it a tourist visa. Instead, I was entitled to a family visa, officially and locally legitimated by a fictitious kinship relationship with my Cuban "parents"-friends I had known since my first visit in 2002 and who had decided that this would be the best way for me to gain official approval to stay in their "humble" household.
Being accepted (to some extent) as a legitimate insider in an area relatively isolated from obvious contrasts between Cuban and tourist provisioning spheres (as opposed to those witnessed daily by Habaneros), I discovered a world in which economic action was far from a direct reflection of rules embedded in Cuban communism and other either/or scenarios (Shanin 1990: 86-91 ) that separate state and market.
State and Market in Cuba: The Historical Formation of the National Moral Economy
Historical representations of Cuban society, such as the national "fight" (lucha) to re-gain "our" land and its products from mercenary power-holders and the Guevarian vision of the "New Men" of socialism who secure collective "needs" through work effort (see below), have, in part, been reactions to the self-interested idea of "man" as depicted in the market model. In the post-1959 period, such historical formations became linked to a socialist version of "morality as asceticism" (Dumont 1977: 76) , according to which inalienable goods for all, such as basic alimentary necessities, were officially valued over superfluous commodities and profits. According to such moral rules set by the Cuban state, which I call the national moral economy, provisioning at the local level must coincide with the "General Welfare" (Myrdal 1953: 16) of the community, a premise not unlike that of the market model, as I argue elsewhere (Wilson, in press) . In the communist model, however, all property (e. Polarities between Cuba as a place for Cubans and Cuba as an economic space that could be bought and sold, had been evident since the second half of the 19th century when the impersonal "factory central system" (Mintz 1956: 337) superseded the paternalist plantation model. The bifurcation of Cuban society continued into the twentieth century, characterized by a rent-seeking and largely corrupt political and economic elite dependent on the "benevolent" hand of the United States, on the one hand, and a heterogeneous group of counter-hegemonic forces, on the other. Indeed, according to Lilian Guerra, Cuba's national "creation myth" (Guerra 2005: 7) is symbolized by the mythical figure of José Martí, whose writings were based on a moral contrast between the dependency and greed of individuals, and autonomy and justice of the nation and of Latin America as a whole. The influential writings of Martí, the Cuban poet and hero who was killed in the War of Independence, perpetuated the idea that the Cuban nation was united in its "defense" against outside economic interests, a depiction that extended to race as well as class: "A Cuban is more than white, more than mulatto, more than black … In the daily life of defense, loyalty, brotherhood, and attack, at the side of every white man there has always been a Negro" (Martí 1977: 29) .
In the twentieth century, moralistic writings by Cuban social scientists largely focused on national polarities between internal and external economies, or between the upper and middle classes who mainly resided in Havana (though many owned land in the countryside) and the poorer rural classes in most other areas of Cuba. In Cuban historiography, for example, the contrast was depicted as that between "nation" and "plantation" (Martinez-Alier 1977: 125 -turns out it's only referred to on one page rather than a whole chapter) in the nineteenth century, or between conciencia (conscience) and existencia (existence) (Martí 1959 ) in the twentieth. Such binarism became a key tool for Cuban nationalism, and was later used by Fidel Castro and his confidant, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, to defend the communist cause and later, political calls for food sovereignty. Like Martí, Guevara was able to incorporate nearly all the political and cultural codes that had characterized Cuba as a nation with a "definable tradition of political dissent" (Kapcia 1997: 25-6) . And, like earlier Cuban intellectuals, Guevara and his followers adopted a kind of "revolutionary ethics," which challenged the "economic rationality" ( commodities. In the process, they were seen as becoming "New Men" of socialism-:
It is not a question of how many kilograms of meat are eaten or how many pretty imported things can be bought with present wages. It is rather that the individual feels greater fulfillment [in work], that he has greater inner wealth and many more responsibilities in our country, the individual knows that the glorious period in which it has fallen to him to live is one of sacrifice. (Guevara 1971: 352) The most influential model of the Cuban economy in the post-1959 period was based on a subordination of individual desires for collective entitlements, such as centralized food distribution. Indeed, in the post-1959 period, historical values initiated by Martí became linked to a kind of "morality as asceticism" (Dumont 1977: 79) , according to which inalienable goods for all, such as basic alimentary necessities, became officially valued over superfluous commodities and profits. From the early 1960s to the early 1990s, this value system evolved in conjunction with a centralized economy, which aligned work effort with peso salaries, which could, in turn, buy a limited selection of basic foodstuffs. As this system depended on the internal control of goods as well as money, pesos (valued on par with the US dollar)
worked as tokens used to buy state-defined necessities rather than money to purchase an unimaginable array of commodities (Holbraad 2000: 9) . distributed to Cubans in usufruct to produce food for their families and for sale (see Funes et al. 2002; Wright 2008) . Driven by a political drive for food sovereignty (as well as economic necessity), the current rise in domestic food production is not only a great benefit for traders, but also for smallholders whom I have already noted as better off than most other people in who had come to the house to buy produce. While the woman who had visited could have brought milk from her family's goat as a gift to Eduardo's family, which would have been exchanged for produce, the woman was "stupid" as she brought only money. Mariela stressed that they always preferred to help others with what they produced, and were happy when people brought items of use to the family. In her terms: "it is not money, it is the feeling one gets knowing you are helping someone." As moral economy theorists of peasant societies (Scott 1976; Edelman 2005 ) have shown, the way people value food in the town of Tuta is as related to sociality as price.
Though Eduardo did engage in market transactions by selling produce to visitors, like his wife he preferred personalized exchanges. He claimed that his farm was more successful because of these exchange relationships, which combined market and non-market or barter transactions. One example that stands out is the relationship between Eduardo and one of his 
Exchange
Among the non-farming public there also seemed to be a fine line between true solidarity and the political requirement to help neighbors when they were in need. As Tutaños indicated, people were always watching others' behavior: "La gente son chimosa" (People are gossips).
Clara (my Cuban "mother") told me this when someone asked her if she was buying beef from the street vendors for "the girl" (me). According to Clara, an affirmative answer to this question is dangerous as word might spread that one is buying beef illegally. While the political pressure to be sociable and generous may direct some neighborly actions, other forms of exchange reflect a cultural solidarity which does not stem entirely from conscious political obligation. As a woman of marriageable age, my initiation into Tutaño society would have been impossible unless I learned how to provision for the household, and this could not happen until I learned the location of houses or places where staple items such as tomato purée were sold legally and illegally. Knowledge about where to find foodstuffs was just as important as knowledge about people, as determinations of quality were based mostly on personal relationships rather than consumer choice. It mattered from whom one bought meat, for example. "Everyone" (todo el mundo) knew that el chino (the Chinese man) sold better quality meat at the market than el gordo (the fat man). In post-Soviet societies such as Cuba and Russia (as well as capitalist societies), "social relations … are both a means to procure and exchange goods, and … a means to evaluate the worth of goods" (Caldwell 2002: 299) .
Anthropologists of post-socialist states such as Caroline Humphrey (1998) have argued that, in contexts where social relations of trust replace a generalized trust in the national currency, personal relations characteristic of barter override the "all-pervasive links of a monetary system" (cited by Trouillot 2001: 128) . As in all centralized economies, supplyconstrained (Verdery 1993: 174) consumers in Cuba survive mostly by working around the system, and an essential element of social capital is acquiring information about where to find goods as well as people who may help in times of need (Humphrey 1998; Verdery 2003: 62) .
Constant communication about where one may find a second-grade item such as fodder "taken" from a factory floor, characterizes the "acquisitionmanship" (vs. "salesmanship";
Verdery 1993: 174) of such "economies of shortage" (Kornai 1980) . Indeed, Cubanologist
Anna Cristina Pertierra argues that personal relationships in consumption and exchange are more prevalent in socialist societies such as Cuba:
Consumers in all societies, whether socialist, capitalist or otherwise can be seen to cultivate personal relationships that defuse the social distance that trade is often seen to create. Nevertheless, the emphasis in socialist states on the state-managed distribution of goods does seem to have a particular counter-effect in that many socialist consumers value even more highly their personal networks as a resource to offset state-imposed constraints. (Pertierra 2007: 121) As in our own globalized economy-society, credit-worthiness in everyday Cuban exchange is linked to trustworthiness in social exchange: "Individualism is predicated on the social order" (Hart 1986: 648) . In Tuta, the criterion of trust in evaluating market traders is partly based on values embedded in nationalist ideas of community. Traders who charge too much money or sell poor-quality items at prices recognized as unfair are referred to as abusadores (abusers).
By contrast, trusted particulares (traders) engage in the market sphere but do not place their own interests in money over the need to offer food at fair prices to their community. Like Jane
Guyer's example of gasoline sellers in Nigeria, 4 local idioms map out when and how to cross the line between collective morality and self-interest. My final example, which considers exchange as well as consumption, further illustrates this point.
5

Consumption
When one day I wanted to buy rum to drink with my Cuban family we had several choices:
• to buy a bottle of Havana Club™ in the hard currency store for $3.25 CUCs (a significant amount for most Tutaños who usually earn about $0.50 a day);
• to buy one from a man living nearby who periodically sold rum on the black market for the equivalent of $1.75 CUCs in pesos (he could afford this). This rum was of a lower quality than Havana Club, but better than the final option;
• La gasolina, a very poor-quality rum (as the name implies) available from a neighbor.
Though my distinctions in quality of available rums may imply a one-to-one relationship between taste and socio-economic standing (Goody 1982; Bourdieu 1984 Bourdieu [1979 ), this hierarchical scheme is not valid for the Cuban context in which I was situated. Indeed, though
Jorge could have easily accepted my offer to buy the highest quality rum, he decided to bring back that of the lowest quality. I asked him his reasoning and he responded: M: And this rum was also given to you for working?
J: Yes. We drank a bit there, but they gave me this too because I worked extra hard. It is not as nice as the others, but it is for everyone.
M: What do you mean?
J: This rum is cheap, it comes from them [the state]. Everyone can buy it. It is good because of this. And everyone got a bit of it at our neighbor's house, but I asked for a small bottle for tonight and worked harder. Now I know my neighbor will come and work for us when we need it.
In speaking of his act, Jorge cited José Martí: "The wine is sour, but it is our wine." This oftquoted adage points to ideas and actions at play in both national and local moral economies.
As with Jorge, Cubans with whom I interacted sometimes preferred the universal distribution of lower-quality goods to commodities bought in the market, especially if the objects in question implicated social relationships. As I have argued elsewhere (Wilson 2009: 37) , the prevalence of social over monetary or quality-based motivations for consumer behavior "call into question Veblenian assumptions about the universal desirability of 'luxury' goods" (Wilson 2009 ).
Conclusion
Like the national moral economy in Cuba, which rests on ideas about the obligations and legitimate undertakings of state and citizens, the local moral economy in Tuta is linked to the interplay of rights and obligations between person and community. Cuban society is reproduced by the constant interplay of national and local levels, and this process involves both assimilation and contestation . As in Cuba, the production, exchange and consumption of food in all societies is a social event or performance, enacted for particular audiences and based on particular social rules for economic behavior. Economic anthropologists have used Karl Polanyi's (2001 Polanyi's ( [1944 ) ideas and later theorists to show that even modern economies cannot be entirely explained by the market principle, as "coeval" (Gregory 1997 )-or copresent and possibly contradictory-schemes of valuation are always at play. In a similar vein, critics of utilitarian economists (e.g. Williams 1973; Sen 1977 Sen , 2002 Davis 2003 Davis , 2004 have argued that social motivations such as commitment (Sen 1977 (Sen , 2002 should not be seen as exogenous to economic processes. As recent reactions to the latest economic crisis indicate, suppositions embedded in our own "global" economy are as value-laden as ever. The announcement of the credit crunch coupled with that of generous bonuses granted to a few top bankers, was, at least on my radio, met with calls for an "unselfish capitalism" and talk of "bringing morality back into banking." More recently, the "Occupy" movement has spread across the globe as citizens demand their share of private and state-controlled assets.
What such "counter-cyclic" (Polanyi 2001 (Polanyi [1944 ) reactions to our market model illustrate is that, like the Cuban communist model, the "science" (Myrdal 1953 : 57) of our modern economy is just as related to values as it is to an affirmation or negation of the Law of
Value. Indeed, we cannot assume that people really desire the kind of general welfare offered by the neoclassical model, premised as it is on the moral imperative to increase one's consumption at all costs, and, inherently, to place the "sum total of happiness" above equal distribution (Myrdal 1953: 11, 41 While most economists rely on either/or (Shanin 1990: 86-91) ideological formulations (or, as current trends would suggest, artificial simulations) 6 to understand the way people choose to provision food and other commodities, anthropologists and other social scientists should look for the "residual components" (Dumont 1980 (Dumont [1966 : 38-9) of historical ideas in everyday action. Notes 1 See, for example, Hart (1986) , Parry and Bloch (1989) , Dilley (1992 ), Gregory (1997 , Sayer (2000) , Graeber (2001) , Leyshon et al. (2003) , Williams et al. (2003) , Maurer (2006) , Fuller et al. (2010) , North (2010) , Samers and Pollard (2010), Seyfang (2010) .
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2 This is part of a case study ("Eduardo") more thoroughly explained in Wilson (2010) .
3 According to Guyer, in Nigeria there are locally-approved methods of earning a profit through sales of gasoline, but some forms of profit are considered unacceptable. The word ojúlówó ("normal price" or "all who want can afford") is morally distinct from wón ("expensive, scarce"), which, in turn, is contrasted with the very negative ajeju ("unnecessary profit, exploitation"), which is often associated with witchcraft (Guyer 2004: 104-5) .
4
I have also referred to this ethnographic event in Wilson (2009b) .
5
Here I am referring to the latest fad of behavioral economics, which arguably strays less far from the dominant liberal paradigm as advocates would suggest. To my knowledge, the very important epistemological and practical distinction between "irrational" economic behavior in the lab and that in social reality has not yet been dealt with in economic anthropology.
